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WESTERN EUROPE
The recent change in monetary policy in
the United Kingdom is an outstanding ex-
ample of the reactivation of credit policy
which has occurred in Western Europe since
the beginning of hostilities in Korea. Faced
with the resumption of strong inflationary
pressures, several countries have invoked
monetary measures for the first time since
the end of the Second World War while
other countries have strengthened earlier
postwar measures and adopted new types of
credit restraint.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER
THE KOREAN OUTBREAK
By the spring of 1950 the economic recov-
ery of Western Europe had made substantial
progress. Production was considerably above
prewar levels and internal financial stability
had been attained in most countries. To-
gether with the currency devaluations of
1949, these achievements brought substan-
tial improvement in balance-of-payments
positions. Nevertheless, currencies remained
inconvertible and American aid was still an
essential condition for the economic bal-
ance of the Western European countries,
whose exports to the dollar area covered
less than one-half of their dollar imports.
During the first half of 1950, with en-
couragement and financial support from the
United States, the countries of Western Eu-
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rope took an important step toward closer
cooperation and integration by reaching
agreement on the establishment of a Euro-
pean Payments Union (EPU), which began
operations in July 1950. The Union may be
described as a clearing house for intra-Euro-
pean payments which also provides a mech-
anism for credit extension and thus re-
quires only partial settlement in gold of the
net debit and credit balances of its members.
In addition to eliminating the system of bi-
lateral payments previously in force, the
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countries participating in the EPU grad-
ually lifted a substantial portion of the
quantitative restrictions affecting intra-Euro-
pean trade and thereby promoted competi-
tion and an improved use of economic
resources within the EPU area.
In some respects, developments following
the outbreak of war in Korea intensified eco-
nomic trends already apparent in Western
Europe. Production increased further, pri-
marily under the stimulus of suddenly in-
creased purchases by consumers and busi-
ness firms. Between the second quarter of
1950 and the second quarter of 1951, output
expanded most in Belgium, France, Ger-
many, and Italy, where in mid-1950 there
was some underutilization of industrial
plant and manpower.
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF



































































































NOTE.—Official indexes for European countries, without adjust-
ment for seasonal variation, converted to January-June 1950
base by Federal Reserve; seasonally adjusted Federal Reserve
index for the United States, converted to January-June 1950 base.
Another favorable aspect of post-Korean
developments was the expansion of dollar
exports to meet increased demands in the
United States. During the year following
June 1950, the Western European countries
earned a larger portion of the dollars needed
for imports than at any time since the end
of the war. Their dollar positions were also
improved by considerable increases in the
dollar exports of their dependent overseas
territories and, in the case of the United
Kingdom, also of the independent members
of the sterling area.
Improvement in trade and payments with
the dollar area exceeded the gradual decline
in United States aid for many European
countries. Consequently, their gold and dol-
lar reserves increased. This development
was particularly striking in the case of the
United Kingdom. Following the large price
increases in raw materials, the overseas ster-
ling countries became large net earners of
dollars. By the end of June 1950 sterling
area reserves of gold and dollars had already
risen by 1 billion dollars from the low point
of 1.3 billion reached just before the devalua-
tion of September 1949. In the year follow-
ing Korea, reserves rose by another 1.4 bil-
lion, even though allocations of United States
aid to Britain were terminated at the end of
1950, largely because of the increase in
reserves.
Notwithstanding continuation of some of
these favorable trends, post-Korean events
greatly complicated the economic problems
faced by Western Europe. Economic stabil-
ity was threatened by the emergence of new
demands upon available resources. Anticipa-
tion of higher prices and fear of an early
recurrence of wartime shortages led to in-
creased domestic and foreign purchases. Also,
the terms of trade of most Western European
countries deteriorated seriously as prices of
imported raw materials rose much faster than
prices of their typical export commodities.
Finally, rearmament began to impose slowly
rising economic and financial burdens.
In conjunction with the rise in raw mate-
rial prices, the increased demands on eco-
nomic resources resulted in strong inflation-
ary pressures. The periods of greatest in-
tensity of these pressures, which varied con-
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siderably from one country to another, were
punctuated in several cases by acute balance-
of-payments difficulties which led to sub-
stantial losses of previously accumulated re-
serves and to the reimposition of trade
restrictions.
RISE IN PRICES
Wholesale prices have risen sharply in
Western Europe since June 1950, as shown
in the table. Through September 1951 the
increase averaged 28 per cent, exceeding this
rate in Sweden, France, and Denmark, and
staying somewhat below it in Italy, the
Netherlands, and Germany. France, Italy,
Belgium, and Denmark had the largest price
increases during the second half of 1950, but
prices in Italy and Belgium declined
promptly with the fall in world prices of
basic materials after February 1951. Since
June 1951 wholesale prices have declined
or remained stable in all countries except
in France, where a substantial increase oc-
curred in October, and in the United King-
dom.
At retail, price increases have been slower
but also more steady than at wholesale, and
have averaged 15 per cent. Wages have gen-
erally moved upward with retail prices.




















































































NOTE.—Official indexes converted to June 1950 base by Federal
Reserve.
As in the United States, expectations of
future developments have accounted for
much of the price rise. The expansion in
defense expenditures was slow to get under
way. Meanwhile, large-scale anticipatory
buying by consumers, producers, and dis-
tributors pressed against the prices of foreign
raw materials, as well as of domestic goods.
Heavy foreign purchases of Belgian steel,
Swedish wood pulp, and many other prod-
ucts of European industry added further
strength to total demand.
In the first six to nine months following
Korea the rapidly climbing prices of im-
ported primary products appeared as the im-
mediate impulse to higher domestic prices.
As the higher import prices affected con-
sumer prices, they led to wage increases and
a threat of wage-price spirals in some of the
countries. Concern over these developments
gave rise, for a short period early in 1951, to
various proposals that the European coun-
tries appreciate their currencies in an attempt
to lower the prices, in their own currencies,
of their imports of basic raw materials. Any
persuasiveness these proposals may have had
quickly disappeared when prices of raw ma-
terials declined and the balances of pay-
ments of some of the major countries de-
teriorated after the first quarter of 1951.
While raw material prices were falling
after March 1951, the earlier rapid increases
continued to be absorbed into the price struc-
tures of the various countries. In France
a significant wage increase, granted in Sep-
tember 1951 to adjust wage levels to the rise
in living costs, contributed to a further round
of price increases and speculative activity
even though import prices had ceased to rise.
EXPANSION OF CREDIT
In many respects the upsurge of both con-
sumer and business purchasing in Western
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Europe after the Korean outbreak was sim-
ilar to that in the United States. Because
of the comparatively minor importance of
consumer durable goods and of consumer
credit, however, consumer purchases ex-
panded much less in Europe than in the
United States. Nevertheless, consumers drew
heavily on funds deposited in banks and
savings institutions and in some countries
reduced their holdings of Government secu-
rities.
Business firms in all Western European
countries found it necessary or desirable to
increase their bank borrowing in order to
finance their greatly enlarged purchases of
materials, both for current production and
for inventory. In France, Germany, Italy,
and Sweden, substantial increases in the
money supply occurred in the year follow-
ing Korea, as shown in the table. In the
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Norway
the increase in the money supply was mod-
erate as budget surpluses or balance-of-
payments deficits approximately offset the
money-creating effects of the private credit
expansion. In Denmark and the Nether-
lands money holdings actually declined
slightly.
The earliest large increases in commercial
bank lending after the Korean outbreak oc-
curred in Belgium, Germany, and Italy,
where bank credit to businesses and individ-
uals rose by more than 20 per cent from June
to December 1950. This increase financed
a sharp rise in output in all three countries
and in Belgium and Germany also financed
expanded inventories of imported raw mate-
rials. In other countries the expansion of
bank credit to businesses and individuals
came somewhat later, as did the increase in
inventory accumulation. As shown in the
table, the bulk of the post-Korean credit ex-
pansion in the United Kingdom, the Neth-
erlands, France, and Norway occurred after
the beginning of 1951.
CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY AND PRIVATE BANK CREDIT
IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
































































1 For European countries, currency outside banks plus demand
deposits, other than interbank and Government, at banking and
postal checking systems. For the United States, currency outside
banks plus demand deposits, other than interbank and U. S. Gov-
ernment, less cash items reported as in process of collection. 2 Commercial bank private credits, exclusive of rediscounts
except for Belgium, France, and Italy, where central bank redis-
counts are of significant importance. For the United States, loans
at all commercial banks.
Source.—International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics for money supply; country sources for bank credit.
The United Kingdom was the only coun-
try that did not experience an increase in
credit during the first half-year following
the Korean outbreak, but recourse to bank
credit became considerable during the first
half of 1951, when imports rose in volume
and even more in value.
Differences in the expansion of bank credit
are associated with the varying effectiveness
of restrictive credit measures and the vary-
ing extent to which business firms of the
Western European countries had to rely
on such credit to finance a larger volume
of operations at higher prices. However,
changes in the volume of imports seem to
have played a particularly important part
in the process of credit expansion. Thus
Belgium and Germany, which reacted more
quickly than the other countries in building
up stocks of foreign goods, experienced a
sharp increase in credit during the second
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half of 1950. France and the United King-
dom, on the other hand, permitted their
stocks to be drawn down during that period
and the major expansion of credit took place
in these two countries in early 1951 when
imports were expanded to replenish in-
ventories.
MONETARY AND CREDIT POLICIES
An inflationary movement as strong as the
one that began in Western Europe in the
summer of 1950 ordinarily calls forth a com-
bination of fiscal measures, credit and mone-
tary measures, and direct controls. In the
past 18 months, however, monetary and
credit policy has been assigned a particu-
larly important role in Western Europe.
The importance of credit expansion in the
inflationary developments during this period
naturally called for specific restrictive meas-
ures in the monetary sphere. The need for
such measures was further strengthened by
the obstacles to an immediate increase in
taxation and by the reluctance to return to
direct controls.
Taxation was heavy in most European
countries even before the Korean war and it
was widely feared that further substantial
tax increases would lead, in large measure, to
increased evasion and reduced savings. Even
where taxes have been increased, they are
scheduled to finance only a portion of the
enlarged armament expenditures. There
have been no substantial cuts in nonmilitary
spending although subsidies have not been
allowed to increase to compensate for rising
import prices and have actually been cut in
some countries.
Little use has been made of new direct
controls, such as allocation of materials, con-
sumer rationing, and price ceilings. In coun-
tries like France, Italy, and Germany, these
controls had broken down during the im-
mediate postwar period and there was little
confidence that they could be effectively re-
stored. The United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, and the Scandinavian countries had
deliberately eliminated an increasing portion
of their comprehensive wartime controls and
were reluctant to reintroduce them.
In this situation credit and monetary
measures have been adopted not only in
Italy, Belgium, Germany, and France, where
they had been used intensively earlier in the
postwar period, but also in those Western
European countries that had previously
shown a definite preference for fiscal policy
and direct controls.
General evidence of this trend is the re-
newed use of the central bank rediscount


























































as shown in the table. But these discount
rate changes were only one aspect of policies
that differed in important respects from one
group of countries to another.
Belgium and Germany. Immediately af-
ter the outbreak of war in Korea the sharp
increase in the demand for goods through-
out the world led to a rapid rise in industrial
output in both Belgium and Germany, which
had available some unemployed manpower
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and industrial capacity. At the same time
there was considerable inventory accumula-
tion, particularly of imported raw materials,
in anticipation of higher levels of output as
well as higher prices and scarcities. As a
result, both countries experienced inflationary
pressures and incurred balance-of-payments
deficits during the second half of 1950, and
both applied corrective monetary measures.
In Belgium the central bank reinforced
the existing system of credit controls, which
is based on a relatively stringent require-
ment that commercial banks hold reserves
in the form of Government securities in
amounts varying from 50 to 65 per cent
of deposit liabilities for different categories
of banks. Under this system commercial
banks frequently find it necessary to redis-
count commercial paper in order to acquire
additional reserves needed for credit expan-
sion. As a result, by altering the terms
and conditions for rediscounting, the central
bank can influence the availability of credit.
For a time after the Korean outbreak, the
monetary authorities supported the expan-
sion of economic activity by a large increase
in rediscounts, but attempted to minimize
the extension of credit for speculative pur-
chases of domestic and imported goods. Re-
discount rates were raised in September
1950, and the eligibility requirements for
rediscounting commercial paper represent-
ing import transactions were made more re-
strictive. Also, commercial banks were
requested to reduce by almost one-fourth
the volume of outstanding consumer credit
and, in general, to refrain from extending
credit for speculative purposes.
Stabilization was rapidly achieved and in
1951 Belgium, favored by strong demand
and high prices for its principal export prod-
ucts, once again earned export surpluses with
the other countries of Western Europe.
These surpluses increased progressively and
by August 1951 Belgium had advanced to
the European Payments Union the full
amount of credit required by its quota. Be-
sides taking measures directly affecting for-
eign trade and payments, the Belgian au-
thorities reduced the rediscount rate in July
and again in September to encourage a larger
absorption of Belgian output by the domestic
market.
In the case of Belgium, the post-Korean
upsurge of demand only temporarily erased
the intra-European surplus which had char-
acterized the Belgian balance of payments
throughout the postwar period. Germany, on
the contrary, incurred very large intra-Euro-
pean deficits which rapidly exhausted its
quota in the EPU. In attempting to stave
off this development, the German authorities
at first relied entirely on restrictive credit
measures. In October 1950 the rediscount rate
and reserve requirements were raised. In
January 1951 commercial banks were ad-
vised to maintain various classes of short-
term credits within certain multiples of their
capital and reserves. These measures were
not sufficiently effective, however, and in
February the government reimposed previ-
ouslv lifted controls on European imports,
and the central bank asked commercial banks
to reduce the volume of short-term credit out-
standing by an amount equivalent to 7.5
per cent of the total.
In March 1951 Germany started earning
export surpluses with the other countries of
Western Europe and by the end of October
had not only repaid a special EPU credit ob-
tained in November 1950, but had virtually
eliminated the entire deficit incurred in the
first eight months following Korea.
The success of Belgium and Germany in
overcoming post-Korean inflationary pres-
sures is largely the result of their credit
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policies. Their current EPU surpluses, while
clearly related to these policies, must also
be ascribed to their ability to deliver goods
urgently needed by other countries for re-
armament or industrial expansion.
Scandinavian countries and the Nether-
lands. Together with the United Kingdom,
whose problems will be discussed separately,
the Scandinavian countries and the Nether-
lands have pursued roughly similar economic
policies in the postwar period. Through
direct controls, subsidies, and anti-inflationary
fiscal policy, and with the help of import
surpluses largely financed by United States
aid, these countries succeeded in containing
the strong inflationary pressures left behind
by occupation expenditures or newly created
by large-scale reconstruction and investment
outlays. Before the middle of 1950, mone-
tary policy was not widely used to com-
bat postwar inflation. In Sweden, in fact,
the policy of supporting a fixed long-term
yield of 3 per cent on government securities
became in itself a contributory cause of
monetary expansion.
The economic pressures generated by the
Korean war led to considerable policy
changes and innovations in this group of
countries. The increase in import prices
forced an abandonment of the former pol-
icy of holding back increases in prices
through subsidies. Wages were then allowed
to move upward and, in order to avoid a
cumulative inflationary movement, it was
found necessary to restrain credit expansion.
Rediscount rates were raised for the first
time in many years in the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Sweden, and reserve require-
ments were introduced in the Netherlands
and in Sweden. In the Netherlands reserve
requirements, supplemented by a system of
credit ceilings, replaced the selective screen-
ing of loans previously used. In Denmark
central bank rediscount privileges for con-
struction loans were withdrawn in October
1950 and not restored until September 1951,
after the central bank had arranged with
the Minister of Finance for a debt manage-
ment operation designed to prevent any con-
sequent expansion in the money supply. In
Norway the monetary authorities, which for
a time had considered the introduction of a
reserve requirement, did not adopt any new
measure; however, the long-term yield on
Government securities, which had remained
at 2
l/2 per cent since 1946, was allowed to
move upward.
In Sweden the policy of maintaining a
stable yield of 3 per cent on Government se-
curities, through central bank purchases if
necessary, had long been the object of pub-
lic discussion. The policy was discontinued
in July 1950, and by December the yield on
Government securities rose by about one-
third of 1 per cent. Thereafter yields re-
mained stable, partly because of new Riks-
bank purchases but principally because of the
favorable development in Sweden's inter-
national position which led to an increase
in the liquidity of banking and business
firms.
Since the early summer of 1951 the pres-
sure on prices has abated in these four coun-
tries, and inflation in general has been held
in check. Some marketing difficulties and
production cutbacks are reported in con-
sumer goods industries in Denmark and the
Netherlands, where the most vigorous fiscal
and monetary measures were adopted to com-
bat internal inflationary pressures as well as
acute balance-of-payments difficulties. How-
ever, increasing defense expenditures and ex-
ports to other European countries are likely
soon to absorb any resources which are
presently unutilized.
France and Italy. The recent sharp con-
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trast between renewal of inflation in France
and continued stability in Italy must be
viewed against the background of substan-
tially similar experiences in the early post-
war period and even during the first post-
Korean year. These countries suffered the
most acute inflations in Western Europe;
each then achieved stabilization, Italy in the
autumn of 1947 and France one year later,
with the help of newly introduced quanti-
tative credit controls and notwithstanding
continuing budget deficits. In both coun-
tries commercial banks are required to invest
a portion of their new deposits in Govern-
ment securities and also to maintain their
existing holdings; in France each bank is at
the same time subject to a rediscount ceiling
at the Bank of France.
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea ap-
pears to have led to considerably less specu-
lative buying in France and Italy than in
most other countries. The volume of im-
ports in the second half of 1950 was smaller
than during the first half and, with exports
rising sharply, each country experienced a
marked improvement in its trade balance
during this period. Restraint on the part
of producers, traders, and consumers in
these countries was apparently not due to a
lack of available credit. Rather it appears
that years of political and economic con-
vulsion had made the public less sensitive,
at least initially, to the change in outlook
brought about by the Korean war.
Under these circumstances neither the
French nor the Italian monetary authorities
reacted to the Korean war by taking new
restrictive monetary measures. The Bank of
Italy, however, warned the banks in August
1950 to use caution, whereas the French
monetary authorities carried over into the
post-Korean period efforts to combat earlier
slight tendencies toward recession.
Italian wholesale prices rose from June
1950 until March 1951 and then began to
decline slowly. Industrial production ex-
panded 17 per cent during that period and
then leveled off until autumn, when a few
indications of declining activity began to
appear. Apparently a considerable portion
of the increase in industrial output during
1951 has been stocked by Italian producers
in anticipation of an enlarged defense effort.
The maintenance of monetary stability in
Italy without the adoption of new measures
of monetary restraint is the more remark-
able since most wages are tied to the cost of
living through sliding scale arrangements.
While French prices rose under the influ-
ence of rising import costs and upward wage
adjustments, there was no evidence of de-
clining confidence in monetary stability un-
til the autumn of 1951. The appreciable
increases in the trade deficit and in the rate
of credit expansion in the course of 1951 ap-
pear to have been associated mainly with the
need to replenish supplies of imported raw
materials. The large rearmament program
to which France is committed was still in
its early stages.
Beginning in September inflationary forces
suddenly gathered strength in France. This
development appears to have derived its im-
pulse in part from the large increase in the
Government-controlled price of wheat which
led to a 30 per cent rise in the price of bread,
and in part from the 15 per cent increase in
the legal minimum wage which resulted in
a general round of wage and price increases.
The price expectations engendered by these
actions, perhaps combined with anticipations
of large rearmament demands, led to specu-
lation in foreign exchange and commodities
reminiscent of the early postwar years.
France's sharply increased deficits with the
European Payments Union, larger than could
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reasonably be accounted for by current com-
mercial transactions, suggested a considerable
flight of capital.
To restrain anticipatory buying and im-
porting, which were financed to a significant
extent by bank credit, the monetary authori-
ties tightened exchange and credit controls.
While rediscount ceilings were raised the
Bank of France announced that, in contrast
to previous practice, it would require strict
day-to-day compliance with these ceilings
and with the existing security reserve require-
ments. Also, recourse to central bank credit
was made more costly through two succes-
sive increases in the rediscount rate.
The present French difficulties appear to
have arisen from a sudden decline of confi-
dence in monetary stability rather than from
a disequilibrium between the basic elements
of demand and available resources. For this
reason, the current measures to restrict credit
are of particular importance.
United Kingdom. Until the recent adop-
tion of new monetary measures, stabilization
policies in the United Kingdom relied far less
on monetary techniques than on direct con-
trols and on the anti-inflationary effect of a
large budget surplus. A considerable expan-
sion in private bank lending occurred in the
postwar period, but, as shown in the chart,
this expansion was partly offset by the reduc-
tion in bank holdings of short-term Treas-
ury paper which was made possible by
budget and import surpluses. As a result,
the volume of money increased only mod-
erately.
After 1947, when the Treasury abandoned
its cheap money drive for a 2
l/2 per cent
long-term rate, yields on long-term securi-
ties were allowed to move upward in re-
sponse to market forces. While this move
was of considerable help in preventing mone-
tary expansion, the rate on Treasury bills re-
DEPOSITS AND BANK CREDIT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Millions of Pounds Monthly Billions of Pounds
NOTE.—All data refer to 11 London clearing banks. De-
posits include demand and time deposits. Short-term Treasury
debt includes, in addition to Treasury bills and Treasury
Deposit Receipts, call money loaned to the money market
against Treasury bills and a small volume of commercial bills.
The large reduction during November of holdings of short-
term Treasury debt and the corresponding rise in securities
holdings reflect the funding operation which is discussed in the
text.
Source.—Bankers' Clearing House, London.
mained fixed, until recently, at the postwar
low of
 l/2 per cent. Maintenance of this rate
was assured, when necessary, by operations of
the Bank of England in the money market;
it was facilitated by the willingness of the
banks to limit private credit expansion in re-
sponse to official requests. These requests,
together with the establishment of broad se-
lective criteria for bank lending, were until
recently the principal positive measure of
monetary restraint.
These stabilization policies were tested
severely by post-Korean developments. Ac-
tive buying on the part of consumers at
home and abroad, the rise in import prices
relative to export prices, and rearmament
made heavy new claims on Britain's eco-
nomic resources. Provision for increased
defense expenditures in the budget for
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1951-52 removed the large surplus on whose
disinflationary impact the government had
relied heavily during the three previous
fiscal years. After the large increases in
gold and dollar reserves during the nine
months following the outbreak of war in
Korea, the foreign balance began to deteri-
orate in the spring of 1951. Internal strains,
such as shortages of manpower, steel, and
coal, also became more pronounced.
In July 1951 the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, in reviewing the increasing eco-
nomic difficulties, noted that the continued
expansion in the level of bank advances
required a tighter check on the banks' lend-
ing policy. It was only after the October
elections, however, that additional monetary
measures, described by the new Chancellor
as a "clear change of emphasis," were taken.
On November 7, 1951, the Bank of Eng-
land's discount rate was raised to 2
l/2 per cent
after having been held at 2 per cent almost
continuously for 19 years. At the same time
the Bank introduced a new rate of 2 per cent
on loans secured by Treasury bills. The latter
rate is of particular significance: while the
central bank may continue to buy and sell
bills largely at the market rate—which has
already risen from
 l/2 to almost 1 per cent
—it can now withhold accommodation ex-
cept at the 2 per cent rate, as in fact it did
on two occasions during November. In this
way the monetary authorities have deliber-
ately introduced uncertainty as to the terms
on which short-term accommodation may
be obtained from the central bank.
As a complementary measure, the Treasury
has converted about one-fifth of the out-
standing Treasury bills into one-, two-, or
three-year securities, yielding from 1% to
1% per cent. This funding operation has
reduced the liquidity of commercial banks
and, together with the new uncertainties as
to official accommodation to the market, is
expected to reinforce the voluntary restric-
tion of credit which had already been oper-
ated with considerable effect by the com-
mercial banks. Concurrently an upward
readjustment of yields for private as well as
official borrowing has taken place in the
long-term market.
CONCLUSION
Economic developments and monetary
policies of Western European countries dur-
ing the past 18 months have shown great
diversity as well as striking similarity. The
diversity relates primarily to the timing and
intensity of the difficulties experienced by
various countries. But the origins of these
difficulties have been similar and the methods
of dealing with them have been remarkably
alike, especially when account is taken of the
widely divergent economic policies in the
earlier postwar period.
Monetary measures have been assigned
an important role in combating inflationary
pressures. In most cases credit expansion
was so clearly associated with inflationary
pressures that the necessity of employing
monetary measures became self-evident.
Thus several countries concluded that they
could no longer permit an important anti-
inflationary instrument to remain unused.
The current experience gives promise that
a better understanding will be gained of the
way in which fiscal policy, monetary policy,
and other measures can supplement and re-
inforce one another. Such an understand-
ing is of particular importance at a time
when the triple task of accelerating the Eu-
ropean defense effort, of maintaining eco-
nomic and social progress, and of minimiz-
ing balance-of-payments deficits will continue
to exert serious pressure on monetary stabil-
ity in Western Europe.
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